complexitystudies

I am having an interesting discussion on the constructivism list; I would like to post an excerpt here on the blog, unfortunately the list archive is only available for members, so no link to the whole discussion

Here the excerpt (the parts proceeded by the ‘>’ or ‘>>’ are not from me, but arguments I am responding too. Names have been anonymized.):

K…Knowledge
R…Relation (True of False)
W…Worldfacts

> > My suggestion is:
> >
> > K —– Rel —— K
> >
> > Knowledge can only be related to other knowledge, there are no
> > accesible worldfacts.

I would principally agree: I would just say that one can not check all
one’s knowledge at the same time. One needs a frame of reference, an
Archimedean point of leverage.

That which I assume fixed in my current discourse are world facts. That
what is to be checked is knowledge (which can then be found to be true
or false).

Of course, this checking from different perspectives will reveal
invariances which remain in all models. That can then be called a “world
fact” with more confidence; in fact, with so much confidence that
calling it anything but reality smacks of the absurd.

> > This means that the whole thing is not grounded in anything like
> > reality or truth or whatsoever. Whatever we do, observing, learning,
> > theorizing etc. etc., it is always just related to itself and not to
> > some outside reality. There is no grounding.

That is were you are mistaken. I call it the bootstrapping triviality.

As a computer needs a BIOS to bootstrap - to understand the commands
which can then be fed it in machine language - so the human being needs
this bootstrapping. But we can rejoice: this tedious work has been done
for us in the past 4 billion years: it is what we call evolution, the
keeping of those solutions which bootstap so they can “receive input” =
know the world = live succesfully.

Peter’s position is somewhat like a computer saying: there is nothing but
machine language, relating to itself.

That all the computer “knows” is presented to it in machine language
does not mean that there is no reality apart from machine language. On
the contrary: giving the computer perceptors (optical sensors etc) and
actuators (a robot arm) will enable it to relate to reality through it’s
actions and its percepts; his/its sense-making will have to be in
machine-language of course.

Our machine language is neuro-electrical activity. That our knowledge
will always be in form of neuro-electrical activity does not mean that
there is nothing else: on the contrary - neuro-electrical activity
(Peter: if this is already to theory-laden for you simply insert
“constructions” or whatever word you prefer) already assumes _so much_
that has to be there beforehand.

This all - mark my words - does not say that there are no constructions:
all knowledge is a construction (that is why I am interested in
constructivism) - but good constructions are grounded (via evolution) in
reality.

This grounding is so basic that it is easy to miss.

> > 2) The quality of models
> >
> > Also widespread is the idea, that when models work well or knowledge
> > works well, it is close to reality or close to truth. This has to be
> > given up completely of course, when we give up the idea of a real
> > world. Then, the quality of models or the quality of knowledge is
> > simply the way it relates to other models or other knowledge.

You are not giving reasons for why we should give up the real world.

You are saying: “Our K is not related to the world if we give up the
existence of the world.”

Sure. And if the moon is made of cheese it is made of cheese.

> > 3) Observation
> >
> > Observation is not something special in this, it is just a very
> > “primary” operation thats why I think it is helpful to take
> > observation as the place where construction starts. Otherwise one
> > could tend to say that we observe the world somehow. In this way, it
> > is similar for animals. All observing systems do exactly the same. Of
> > course, humans can do more, but in respect to observation I can see
> > no difference between humans an animals.

I agree 100%.

> > reference can lead to eigenvalues in thinking, so to reasoning which
> > is fully closed and to positions that can nor be proven nor rejected.
> > Dogmas is the correct word for it.

Ah finally - the solipsist leap has been taken. I gathered that
constructivists want to evade solipsism?

> > Whithin a dogmatic social field one is not allowed to raise certain
> > questions any more, we now that out of history. Loet’s last question
> > for example “Aren’t some statements more true than others?” I would
> > fully deny. Some statements can fit more to other statements, but
> > that does never mean that they fit more to some external reality, so
> > they can never be more true.

David Deutsch (in his wonderful book “The Fabric of Reality”) says:
“Reality is what kicks back.”

Peter’s definition fits what we call “consistency”. That is what applies
to fiction novels: here indeed, it is sufficient that statements simply
fit to each other (to make an interesting story; inconsistent novels
tend to bore us pretty quickly).

But, as I have amply demonstrated with the water room example, there is
a reality fortunately which “kicks back”.

BTW: where does a constructivist take his criterion of _consistency_
from? How does a constructivist denying reality know when statemants
“fit” to each other. Is this some a priori knowledge?

> > I came to the conclusion that a dogma claiming to have found the
> > truth is very dangerous.

Agreed! But you are _ignoring_ what I posted before: scientific realism
never says we have _found_ truth. It says we are _looking_ for it - and
we are prepared to leave an anthropocentric stance in favor of knowing
how the world really is.

> > A dogma like I suggest that nothing can be true I think can never be
> > dangerous since it does never allow to dominate others.

It is already a dogma: it’s formal structure makes it a dogma, even if
it asserts it’s own contradiction.

> > when all rational observers can agree, this can very well mean that
> > they all make the same mistake. There is no valid reason to think
> > that it is close to truth.

Agreed - but, given that they are _truly_ rational, they are prepared to
drop their model if new evidence crops up. You can’t sensibly ask for more.

> > Now we have a third person called Peter. If he is thirsty and he sees
> > a glass of water, he will drink it but he nevertheless says: Myself,
> > the glass of water and my thirst all do not really exist. All these
> > are just constructions but not true, not real. The way all these
> > observations exist is thru creating them by observing them but they
> > are not really there.
> >
> > Peter is also fully rational. It is a fully rational position.

Absolutely. Everybody knows that solipsism is irrefutable.

>> >> BTW: why do you find it pleasant to know nothing? I have fun
>> >> knowing more things, that’s why I try to learn something new every
>> >> day.
> > Good question. We have to check and compare both states carefully.
> > Have you ever experienced a short overwhelming moment where you had
> > the feeling to know nothing? It is a very good feeling!

To know that I know nothing I just have to look up at the starry sky on
a clear night. Or at the blossoming of a flower on a warm spring day.
The dao is great - we will not run out of things to know, and even
spending a lifetime to learn things will leave us these moments of
knowing nothing. One need not strive actively for this; one can enjoy it
even if one dedicates his life to knowing the world.

>I would say the disturbance is just noise, the universe could be just
>noise! Why not?
>Regularities are created thru the process of observation and analysis
>etc.

Is not an observation a regularity? Your memory of past observations?
Your constructions? I think even a hardcore solipsist would have trouble
negating regularities?

Addendum:

The water room example mentioned above is the following:
We have a glass of water in room A. Room B is empty. Scientist Sammy is
thirsty (very thirsty!). Irrationalist Irene is too. Sammy sees a glass
of water in room A, goes there and drinks it. That’s pretty good for him.

Irrationalist Irene is pretty thirsty too. She says knowledge does not
exist. After a time, she’s fed up with her philosophy and goes into room
A to drink a glass of water. Unfortunately, I can’t take her seriously
anymore (unless she’s changed her opinion about knowledge now).

My argument is that one should only take seriously philosophical world views on which one is prepared to act. Somebody who says something absurd (and wants to be taken seriously) but then does not act on his absurd premises forfeits his intellectual honesty.

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